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The Louisiana Constitution provides for criminal cases that “appellate 
jurisdiction extends only to questions of law.”1 This Article asks a simple 
question: what does that mean? 
Perhaps the Louisiana Constitution restricts appellate courts from 
reviewing any error of fact in criminal matters. Yet, defendants in criminal 
proceedings who appeal guilty verdicts often argue there was insufficient 
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To review those claims, 
appellate courts must review facts; therefore, interpreting the Louisiana 
Constitution to prohibit any review of factual errors in criminal matters 
appears misleading.  
There is likely a more nuanced interpretation of the Louisiana 
Constitution; however, there is only one significant scholarship on this 
topic, and it was published in 1959.2 Much has changed since then, 
including Louisiana’s new constitution in 1974. This Article is an effort to 
update that scholarship based on Louisiana constitutional history, 
Louisiana jurisprudence, and United States Supreme Court precedent. 
                                                                                                             
 1. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C). 
 2. This Article is indebted to the thorough scholarship of the late-Joseph G. 
Hebert’s Comment, Appellate Review on the Facts in a Criminal Case, 19 LA. L. 
REV. 843, 844 (1958), and we incorporate much of its research. Mr. Hebert’s 
comment has two notable citations: one in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion and 
another in a law review article recognizing its achievement. Shortly after Mr. 
Hebert’s article was published, the U.S. Supreme Court cited it. See Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 161 n.6 (1961). At issue in Garner was the 
constitutionality of a conviction in Louisiana. Id. at 159. In discussing the 
procedural history, the Court noted the Louisiana Supreme Court had denied writ, 
with an oral opinion stating, in part: “This court is without jurisdiction to review 
facts in criminal cases.” Id. at 161. In a footnote, the Court cited the Louisiana 
constitutional provision that provides appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases over 
questions of law. Id. at n.6. In support, the Court cited Mr. Hebert’s article. Id. 
Interestingly, in that same footnote, the Court suggested that even if the Louisiana 
Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction, it still should have general 
supervisory jurisdiction, which can be exercised in the sound discretion of the court. 
Id. Many years later, in an article celebrating the Louisiana Law Review, Professor 
Paul R. Baier mentioned Mr. Hebert’s comment as one of 26 Louisiana Law Review 
citations found in U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Paul R. Baier, Foreword: Volume 
75—Of Legal Scholarship and the Louisiana Law Review, 75 LA. L. REV. 971, 978 
(2015). Among this group of citations, Professor Baier highlighted Mr. Hebert’s 
comment as one of his favorites. Id. at n.42. Mr. Hebert is now deceased (records 
indicate his bar status changed to deceased on April 29, 1979). Though Mr. Hebert 
of course lived to see his article cited by the United States Supreme Court, he sadly 
did not see Professor Baier further distinguish his comment. 




Louisiana appellate courts use at least three standards to apply to review 
facts in criminal matters. 
First, the constitutional limitation to “questions of law” should not 
apply to pretrial or procedural issues—e.g., pretrial rulings to quash an 
indictment or motions to suppress certain evidence. The constitutional 
limitation to questions of law applies only to facts addressing a defendant’s 
guilt or innocence; therefore, for pretrial or procedural facts, a reviewing 
court is free to review. 
Second, for facts that go to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in 1979 that due process requires appellate courts to 
review convictions for sufficiency of evidence.3 Ever since then, Louisiana 
appellate courts determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of 
fact that all of the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Third, to review a defendant’s sentence, appellate courts must review 
facts. Appellate courts may weigh the seriousness of the crime, e.g., 
whether it is a crime of violence under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:2 
or a nonviolent offense. Similarly, appellate courts review whether a court 
can sentence a defendant as a multiple offender. 
By providing a fresh look at the Louisiana Constitution, this Article 
aims to trigger further interest in the complex nature of Louisiana appellate 
review of criminal cases. Part I briefly discusses the fundamental 
distinction between law and fact. Part II introduces the provisions in the 
Louisiana Constitution providing appellate jurisdiction. Part III is a brief 
historical review of changes in the Louisiana Constitution’s definition of 
appellate jurisdiction. Part IV analyzes the Constitution of 1974 and 
provides examples of appellate review of criminal facts.4 Finally, Part V 
examines what facts remain unreviewable by appellate courts. 
I. A BRIEF REFRESHER ON THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
LAW AND FACT 
Courts often approach factual and legal questions differently. 
Generally, trial courts determine the facts and appellate courts determine 
the law. Conventionally, facts are the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” 
                                                                                                             
 3. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
 4. The authors selected certain issues to provide contrasting examples of 
appellate review. But it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all issues 
appellate courts review in criminal cases. For example, the Article does not 
discuss post-conviction or collateral review, nor does it distinguish between 
capital and non-capital cases. 




“why,” and “how” of a case;5 the law is the governing rule, as a 
constitution, statutes, codes, rules, and judicial opinions state. 
For example, most drivers should understand that they cannot drive 
through a red light;6 a trial court could determine who was driving the car, 
whether the red light had any malfunctions, and whether the light was red. 
The court determines these facts by admitting or denying evidence, 
hearing witness testimony, or taking judicial notice of other forms of 
evidentiary proof. All of this information later constitutes the “record,” 
which an appellate court reviews and determines whether, under the facts, 
it was against the law to drive through the red light. 
In reviewing the record, the appellate court may state that it will defer 
to the lower court’s findings of fact. Frequently, the amount of deference 
is based on a “standard of review.” A leading scholar on appellate law 
defines standards of review as “whether the reviewing court should defer 
to the trial court, and, if so, to what extent.”7 
Most cases, however, are more complicated than a traffic violation;8 
records can be more detailed, and factual and legal issues are often 
intertwined. Notwithstanding these hurdles, under the Louisiana 
Constitution, determining appellate jurisdiction for criminal cases may 
hinge on the fact-versus-law distinction—or maybe not. 
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION 
The Louisiana Constitution is the governing document that provides 
courts with jurisdiction—i.e., the power to make legal decisions9—over 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2003) (“Under the conventional view, 
legal issues concern the applicable rules and standards; factual issues involve the 
underlying transaction or events, in other words, ‘who did what, where, when, 
how, why, with what motive or intent.’”). 
 6. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 32:232(3)(b) (2018) (providing instructions 
on traffic-control devices); id. § 32:231(A) (mandating drivers obey instructions 
of traffic-control devices). 
 7. DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, 
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 222 (2d ed. 2006). 
 8. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. 
L. REV. 14, 20 (1992) (internal quotations removed). The article gives a great 
example of why it is difficult to distinguish facts from law. It states: “[W]hile some 
factual issues seem like observations, i.e. was it raining, those same factual issues 
could also be thought of as questions of fact that require reflection—i.e. was it a 
light drizzle or heavy rain—from other observations.” Id. at 39. 
 9. For a definition of jurisdiction in a Louisiana treatise, see Jurisdiction of 
court, LA. PRAC. CIV. APP. § 1:1 (“Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of 




criminal and civil cases. Criminal law concerns punishment of those whom 
the government accuses of committing a crime such as theft, robbery, or 
murder, and then seeks to impose a penalty.10 In contrast, civil cases 
resolve disputes between two or more parties.11 The Louisiana Constitution 
provides different types of courts to hear both civil and criminal cases. 
Typically, the first court to hear a case is a trial court, or a “district court.”12 
After, intermediary appellate courts can review what happened at the trial 
court.13 The highest appellate court is the Louisiana Supreme Court, which 
can review decisions either trial courts or intermediary appellate courts 
made.14 
Two sections in Article V of the Louisiana Constitution govern the 
scope of appellate jurisdiction, one for the Supreme Court and the other 
for the courts of appeal.15 For the Supreme Court, Article V, § 5 provides, 
in pertinent part: 
(C) Scope of Review. Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases 
extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate 
                                                                                                             
a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations 
of the parties and to grant the relief to which they are entitled.”). For a more 
general definition, see Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“A court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.”). 
 10. A “criminal proceeding,” as defined in Louisiana’s Administrative Code, 
is “any litigation involving the investigation or commission of any offense 
punishable by imprisonment, confinement, or custody.” LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 22, 
§ 103 (Definitions). 
 11. For instance, one Louisiana Supreme Court decision defines a civil case 
as including “a dispute between private parties and results in a money judgment 
affecting only those parties.” Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. 1990) 
(overruled by constitutional amendment on grounds not pertinent to the definition 
of a civil matter). The Court is defining the term “civil matter” as the Louisiana 
constitutional article on district court jurisdiction uses. For purposes of this 
Article, civil cases are referred to as anything not criminal, i.e., family law 
disputes, administrative suits, and certain juvenile proceedings. 
 12. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 16(A)(1) (“Except as otherwise authorized by this 
constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative 
agency determinations in worker's compensation matters, a district court shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters.”). 
 13. See id. art. V, §§ 5 (Supreme Court) & 10 (Courts of Appeal). 
 14. See id. art. V, § 5. 
 15. Id. Section 5 describes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and § 10 
describes the jurisdiction of the intermediate courts of appeal. 




jurisdiction[16] extends only to questions of law.[17] 
For the courts of appeal, Article V, § 10 provides, in pertinent part: 
(B) Scope of Review. Except as limited to questions of law by this 
constitution, or as provided by law in the review of administrative 
agency determinations, appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal 
extends to law and facts. In the review of an administrative agency 
determination in a worker’s compensation matter, a court of 
appeal may render judgment as provided by law, or, in the interest 
of justice, remand the matter to the administrative agency for 
further proceedings. In criminal cases[18] its appellate jurisdiction 
extends only to questions of law.[19] 
These provisions provide that appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases 
extends only to questions of law. The purpose of limiting appellate review 
in criminal cases to questions of law is to limit review of a jury verdict—
and sometimes a judge—of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. In contrast, 
appellate jurisdiction in civil cases extends to law and fact. 
The U.S. Constitution treats criminal and civil facts in the opposite 
way.20 For civil cases, the Seventh Amendment generally prohibits courts 
                                                                                                             
 16. Curiously, the provisions include the phrase “appellate jurisdiction,” not 
“appellate court jurisdiction.” This is an intriguing phrase because appellate 
jurisdiction is supposed to refer only to cases that must be appealed. But 
interpreting the constitutional restriction of factual review to just those cases that 
must be appealed would create an odd disparity between appellate jurisdiction 
and supervisory jurisdiction. 
 17. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 18. In the Supreme Court provision, it includes the phrase “criminal matters,” 
but in the Courts of Appeal provision, it includes the phrase “criminal cases.” This 
is a curious inconsistency. Discussing another section in the Constitution of 1974, 
Professor Hargrave discusses that “[t]he reference to matters, rather than cases, 
accommodates ex parte, non-contradictory proceedings in the district courts which 
may not technically be adversary cases.” Lee Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of 
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765, 810 (1977). Apparently, 
the words “matters” and “cases” do not mean the same thing. 
 19. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 20. At least one scholar, Professor William Crawford, believes the grant of 
authority to review facts in civil cases is problematic. See William E. Crawford, The 
Constitutional Authority Giving Our Appellate Courts Jurisdiction of Fact Should 
Be Repealed, 73 LA. L. REV. 703 (2013) (based on a review of selected Louisiana 
appellate cases and data from the National Center for State Courts, the author argues 
that the jurisdiction of fact in civil cases may be why Louisiana has a higher caseload 
compared with other states of similar populations). 




from reviewing a jury’s findings of fact.21 Specifically, the Seventh 
Amendment states, “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”22 
Conversely, there is no similar constitutional restriction on the review of 
facts in criminal cases.23 
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION 
The Louisiana Constitution enacted in 1974 (“Constitution of 1974”) 
is the current operative version. Commentators refer to it by its date 
because there have been ten Louisiana Constitutions.24 Of all states, 
Louisiana has had the most constitutions,25 which may be a good or bad 
                                                                                                             
 21. The current practice in federal courts, however, is not rigid. Generally, 
despite the Seventh Amendment, federal courts may conduct a complete review of 
facts—even in jury trials—when those facts matter to important constitutional or 
jurisdictional issues. See Christie, supra note 8, at 52 (“As the evolving doctrine of 
constitutional fact demonstrates, the strictures of the Seventh Amendment have 
never been an insurmountable impediment to a federal court’s reviewing a jury’s 
findings.”). Professor Christie’s article discusses two foundational pieces of 
scholarship on this topic: LOUIS. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 629–30 (1965) (jurisdictional fact); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: 
Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of “Constitutional 
Fact”, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055, 1059–63 (1932) (constitutional fact). For a recent 
discussion on this point, see Martin H. Redish & William D. Gohl, The Wandering 
Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 322–23 (2017). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This amendment affected Article III, § 2 of the 
Federal Constitution, which provides: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
 23. See id. amend. VI. 
 24. These include: LA. CONST. of 1812; LA. CONST. of 1845; LA. CONST. of 
1852; LA. CONST. of 1864; LA. CONST. of 1868; LA. CONST. of 1879; LA. CONST. 
of 1898; LA. CONST. of 1913; LA. CONST. of 1921; LA. CONST. of 1974. In this 
Article, each constitution will be referred to by its date. 
 25. See Warren G. Billings, Introduction, in IN SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW, LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS, 1812–1974 3 (Warren G. Billings & Edward 
F. Haas eds., 1993) (“The eighteenth state to join the Union, Louisiana has had more 
constitutions than any other state.”); see also id. at 21–22 (Judith K. Schafer, Reform 
or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of 1845 (“Ten constitutions (or eleven 




thing26—good because multiple constitutional conventions enabled 
Louisiana to declare fundamental principles of its governing laws that 
aligned closely to the times; bad because frequent constitutional 
conventions and amendments can enable certain interest groups to exert 
too much influence on the shape of Louisiana law.27  
Starting in 1812, as a condition of statehood, Louisiana enacted its first 
constitution.28 At that time, appellate courts had no jurisdiction to review 
criminal cases.29 The public outcry of being unable to contest a guilty 
verdict was great.30 In 1843, the Louisiana Legislature established the 
                                                                                                             
if the 1861 secession convention can be counted) is a staggering but dubious 
achievement. Only Georgia comes close to achieving such an honor, with six.”)). 
 26. Billings, supra note 25, at 3. (“Whether that is a record to scorn or prize 
is a matter of perspective. It may indicate a ‘fickleness’ among the state’s 
constitution-makers or the lack of a self-governing tradition. Such conclusions 
have found credent with some pundits who have never bothered to examine those 
interpretations in more than a superficial way.”). Professor Billings goes on to 
suggest that the essays compiled in the book suggest a different conclusion. Id. 
 27. See Michael L. Kurtz, The Era of Edwin Edwards, 1972–1987, in 
LOUISIANA: A HISTORY 396 (Bennett H. Wall & John C. Rodrigue eds., 2014); 
see also Mark T. Carleton, Fundamental Special Interests: The Constitution of 
1974, in IN SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW, LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS, 
1812–1974, supra note 25, at 142. Another example of selective influence on 
Louisiana Constitutions is the relatively brief period between the Constitution of 
1845 and Constitution of 1852. See Judith Kelleher Schafer, The Political 
Development of Antebellum Louisiana, in LOUISIANA: A HISTORY 142 (Bennett H. 
Wall & John C. Rodrigue eds., 2014). 
 28. W.O. Hart, The Constitutions of Louisiana, 1812 to 1913, 2 LOY. L.J. 1, 1 
(1920–21) (“The Constitution of 1812, under which the State was admitted into the 
Union, was adopted in convention held at New Orleans, January 2, 1812 . . . [and] 
remained in force for thirty-three years, the Constitution of 1845 having been 
adopted in convention on May 14th of that year.”). 
 29. For an excellent discussion on the history of criminal law in Louisiana, see 
Warren M. Billings, Origins of Criminal Law in Louisiana, in THE LOUISIANA 
PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY, VOL. XII: AN 
UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE LAW AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN LOUISIANA 1803–
2003 761. 
 30. See id. at 763 (Professor Billings discusses the public’s opinion of the 
lack of criminal appellate jurisdiction, and states that that the lack of criminal 
appellate jurisdiction “was an opinion that never fully satisfied the lower bench, 
the bar, or the literate public. Critics contended that uniform justice could not exist 
without appellate review. Moreover, the absence of uniformity meant the guilty 
might go free while the innocent lost liberty or worse.”) 




Court of Errors and Appeals, which heard criminal appeals.31 The state 
abolished the Court of Errors and Appeals in 1845 when the new Louisiana 
Constitution provided the Louisiana Supreme Court with jurisdiction to 
review criminal cases.32 As a result, criminal defendants had the right to an 
appeal, which was “the first time that such a right was made explicitly 
constitutional in any American constitution.”33 
Thus, since 1845, appellate courts have had the constitutional authority 
to review criminal cases. From 1845 to 1921, all iterations of the related 
constitutional provision included the word “alone” following the phrase 
“questions of law.”34 It is not clear what “alone” meant. One judge 
believed that it was meant to exclude even blended questions of law and 
fact.35 The meaning of the word is no longer pertinent, as the word “alone” 
does not appear in the Constitution of 1974. 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. (“Legislators responded in 1843 when they erected a court of errors 
and appeals. Their solution was only a stopgap measure however. The second 
constitutional convention abolished the Court of Errors and Appeals, and the 
delegates assigned appellate jurisdiction to a revamped Supreme Court.”). 
 32. LA. CONST. art. 63 (1845) (“[A]nd in criminal cases on questions of law 
alone, whenever the punishment of death or hard labor may be inflicted, or when 
a fine exceeding three hundred dollars is actually imposed.”); see also Judith K. 
Schafer, Reform or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of 1845, in IN 
SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW, LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS, 1812–1974, 
supra note 25, at 33 (noting that at the time of enacting the Constitution of 1845 
“[t]here seemed to be a general agreement that the jurisdiction of the supreme 
court should be extended to include criminal appeals (in the Constitution of 1812 
the court was only permitted to take civil appeals)”). 
 33. See Jeremiah E. Goulka, The First Constitutional Right to Criminal 
Appeal: Louisiana’s Constitution of 1845 and the Clash of the Common Law and 
Natural Law Traditions, 17 TUL. EURO. CIV. L.F. 151, 194 (2002). The Article 
states that before 1845, many state supreme courts interpreted their constitutions 
as providing both civil and appellate jurisdiction, but that Louisiana was the first 
state to make it explicit. Id. at 153; see also State v. Washington, 380 So. 2d 64, 65 
(La. 1980) (noting that under the 1974 constitution an accused has a constitutional 
right of appeal in Louisiana). Today, Article I, § 19 of the Louisiana Constitution 
provides this right, stating:  
No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or 
property without the right of judicial review based upon a complete 
record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based. This right may 
be intelligently waived. The cost of transcribing the record shall be paid 
as provided by law. 
See also State v. Malone, 25 So. 3d 113, 122 (La. 2009) (providing a history of 
this constitutional provision). 
 34. See supra note 24. 
 35. State v. Seiley, 6 So. 571, 575–77 (La. 1889) (Fenner, J., dissenting). 




 The second-to-last iteration of the Louisiana Constitution was the 
Constitution of 1921. It provided: “The appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court shall also extend to criminal cases on questions of law 
alone, whenever the penalty of death, or imprisonment at hard labor may 
be imposed; or where a fine exceeding three hundred dollars or 
imprisonment exceeding six months has been actually imposed.”36 
A 1959 student article that Joseph G. Hebert wrote and published in the 
Louisiana Law Review interpreted the Constitution of 1921.37 Mr. Hebert 
determined that appellate court jurisdiction over criminal matters was not 
restricted to pure questions of law.38 According to Mr. Hebert, the 
Louisiana Constitution did not prevent an appellate court from reviewing 
all facts in a criminal matter. Rather, some factual issues could be 
reviewed. As Mr. Hebert states: 
It is inevitable, however, that questions of law do not arise in a 
vacuum void of facts. To interpret the constitutional provision as 
restricting the court’s power of review to questions of “pure law” 
would emasculate the utility of appellate review. Recognizing this, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional 
provision so as to allow, in effect, a review or “examination” of the 
facts in a criminal case in certain limited instances. Thus although 
questions of fact passed on by the jury are generally beyond review, 
where the trial judge himself passes on mixed questions of law and 
                                                                                                             
 36. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (1921). Confining appellate review to questions 
of law corresponded with another provision, which provided “[t]he jury in all 
criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt 
or innocence . . . .” id. art. XIX, § 9. In full, that provision states: 
In all proceedings or indictments for libel, the truth thereof may be given 
in evidence. The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of the law 
and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged 
as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge. 
Id. A similar rule is currently in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 
802, which provides:  
The court shall charge the jury: 
(1) As to the law applicable to the case; 
(2) That the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the question 
of guilt or innocence, but that it has the duty to accept and to apply the 
law as given by the court; and 
(3) That the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility of the 
evidence. 
 37. Joseph G. Hebert, Comment, Appellate Review on the Facts in a Criminal 
Case, 19 LA. L. REV. 843 (1959). 
 38. See id. at 844. 




fact or on questions of fact which do not directly pertain to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, such facts are reviewable.39 
Mr. Hebert’s article cited a 1919 Louisiana Supreme Court decision, 
which noted the Louisiana Constitution “does not apply to a question of 
fact, upon which the trial judge has based a ruling, not pertaining to the 
question of guilt or innocence, or to the merits of the case.”40 For example, 
there is “no constitutional prohibition” to review facts regarding the 
appropriate venue for a criminal trial.41 
Further, Mr. Hebert found appellate courts could examine facts that 
pertain to the guilt or innocence of a defendant.42 That is, if there was no 
evidence of an essential element of the crime, the question of law before 
the appellate court is “whether it be lawful to convict an accused without 
any proof whatsoever as to his guilt.”43 But if the appeal concerned 
evidence to support or negate a conviction, it was unreviewable. Appellate 
courts could not even question whether the evidence was sufficient to 
prove the conviction was beyond approach.44 For instance, in a case in 
which a court convicted a defendant of possession of whiskey with the 
intent to sell, the appellate court held that it could not review the 
evidence.45 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. at 844–45 (internal citations omitted). 
 40. State v. Smith, 83 So. 189, 190 (La. 1919). 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Paternostro, 68 So. 2d 767, 770 (La. 1953) (“It has been 
the jurisprudence of this court since State v. Moore, 1916, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 
965, that, although the question of venue is one of fact, it is a matter not pertaining 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused which may be raised in limine and that 
there is no constitutional prohibition of the right of the trial judge or this court to 
decide the issue.”). 
 42. Hebert, supra note 37, at 844. For examples cited in the article, see State 
v. Thomas, 69 So. 2d 738, 741 (La. 1953); State v. D’Ingianni, 47 So. 2d 731, 734 
(La. 1950); State v. Drew, 11 So. 2d 12, 13 (La. 1942). 
 43. Hebert, supra note 37, at 845–46 (quoting State v. Nomey, 16 So. 2d 226, 
227 (La. 1943)). 
 44. State v. Haddad, 59 So. 2d 411, 417–18 (La. 1951). The issue in Haddad 
was said to be before the Court “under [its] supervisory jurisdiction.” Id. at 413. 
In addressing the sufficiency claim, the Court noted that its “appellate 
jurisdiction” vested only upon a question of law where “there is no evidence at all 
upon some essential element of the crime charged.” Id. at 417. That statement 
possibly undermines the thought commenters and the U.S. Supreme Court offered 
that the Court might have the power to review facts in criminal cases under its 
supervisory jurisdiction. 
 45. State v. Smith, 95 So. 705 (La. 1923). 




For many years, such was the form of appellate jurisdiction over 
criminal cases. After the Constitution of 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1979 found that due process requires appellate courts to review 
convictions for sufficiency of evidence.46 That 1979 decision altered 
Louisiana’s scope of review of criminal facts. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1974 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1979 that changed the 
landscape of criminal appellate review, Louisiana enacted the Constitution 
of 1974, the most recent state constitution.47 Similar to Mr. Hebert’s 
analysis of the Constitution of 1921, the Constitution of 1974 restricts 
appellate review on matters of guilt or innocence only to pure questions of 
law.48 For all other factual issues, however, the Constitution of 1974 
does not restrict review. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed this 
point in 1981 in State v. Campbell.49 In that case, a defendant moved to 
quash the indictment because, as he claimed, the case was not brought to 
trial within the two-year limitation period.50 The trial court granted the 
                                                                                                             
 46. “Louisiana law has been displaced in part by fourteenth amendment due 
process standards which require appellate courts to review whether the evidence 
has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” John S. Baker, Jr., Criminal Law, 
44 LA. L. REV. 279 (1983). Mr. Baker appears to make the case that the courts 
used Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:438 to expand the scope of appellate review 
beyond Jackson. Id. at 282. 
 47. Originally, only the Louisiana Supreme Court had the authority to review 
criminal cases. See Hargrave, supra note 18, at 771 (stating that “[t]he Judiciary 
Committee considered the possibility of providing some intermediate appellate 
review of criminal matters instead of continuing the prior system of having most 
criminal appeals heard by the supreme court.”). A criminal appeal or writ would 
skip the intermediate appellate court. That all changed on July 1, 1982, when the 
original criminal appellate jurisdiction was transferred to the intermediate 
appellate, or circuit, courts. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (eff. July 1, 1982) (“[A] 
court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction of . . . all criminal cases triable by a 
jury,” except when a law has been declared unconstitutional or when the death 
penalty has been imposed). The text referenced at the beginning of this Part is what 
is in effect today. 
 48. “Traditionally, the scope of appellate review of criminal convictions on 
matters of guilt or innocence has been rather restricted in Louisiana due to state 
constitutional provisions and the broad language of the Criminal Code which 
leaves most issues to be resolved by the jury as questions of fact.” Baker, Jr., 
supra note 46, at 279. 
 49. State v. Campbell, 404 So. 2d 956, 959 (La. 1981). 
 50. Id. at 957. 




motion to quash.51 After the State filed a writ to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court,52 the defense counsel argued the court did not have jurisdiction to 
review the factual question.53 The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed: 
We are unable to agree with defense counsel’s contention that 
because interruption of prescription involves a question of fact this 
court is prohibited by Article 5, § 5(C), of the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974 from reviewing the trial court's decision 
thereon. In State v. Guilot, 200 La. 935, 9 So. 2d 235 (La. 1942), 
this court stated: “Although the plea of prescription presented in a 
criminal case is a question of fact, it is not a question of fact relating 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused. The decision of the trial 
judge as to whether the offense charged is prescribed is reviewable 
by this court on the same facts upon which the decision was based.” 
However, it is quite clear that in reviewing a trial judge’s ruling on 
a preliminary motion this court attaches great weight to his factual 
determinations and will not disturb them unless they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Holley, 362 So. 2d 1089 (La. 1978).54  
Appellate courts can review questions of fact not related to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. Because State v. Campbell is a 1981 case, it 
interpreted the Constitution of 1974. The court also relied on a 1942 case,55 
indicating that this distinction had been around for a while. 
But did this distinction matter to delegates at the 1973 Constitutional 
Convention? According to the convention transcripts, the delegates only 
once discussed extending appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases to facts. 
One delegate, Judge Albert Tate—whose judicial career spanned the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal, Louisiana Supreme Court, and U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—briefly noted that the committee did not 
seriously consider extending review of facts to criminal cases.56 Without 
any guidance from the 1973 Constitutional Convention, we must rely on 
jurisprudence and secondary sources. 
The Louisiana Constitution’s limitation on appellate review of criminal 
facts distinguishes facts that prove a defendant’s guilt or innocence from 
other facts. To provide examples of this distinction, the next three subparts 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 959. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. VOLUME VI, RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 728 (Aug. 15, 1973). 




discuss the applicable standards governing issues that arise: (1) pretrial; (2) 
during trial; and (3) at sentencing. 
A. Pretrial 
Appellate courts review pretrial facts under a deferential standard of 
review.57 The standard of review is sometimes called “manifest error” or 
“clearly erroneous.”58 The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that this 
standard does not simply require an appellate court to look for some 
evidence to support a judgment but, instead, requires an appellate court to 
determine whether the judgment is “clearly wrong considering all the 
                                                                                                             
 57. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 25 So. 3d 746, 751 (La. 2009) (“As a general rule, 
this Court reviews trial court rulings under a deferential standard with regard to 
factual and other trial determinations, while legal findings are subject to a de novo 
standard of review.”); see also State v. Hampton, 750 So. 2d 867, 884 (La. 1999) 
(“As a general rule, deferential standards of review apply to factual and other trial 
determinations, while determinations of law are subject to de novo review.”). 
 58. For examples of the phrase “manifest error,” see State v. Higgins, 898 So. 
2d 1219 (La. 2005) (photo lineup not rendered unduly suggestive by information 
conveyed to the witness by the police that the lineup contains a photo of the suspect; 
trial court’s ruling that the police conducted the lineup fairly and did not coerce or 
otherwise influence the witness into selecting defendant’s picture entitled to great 
deference on review and will not be set aside in the absence of manifest error); State 
v. Ball, 824 So. 2d 1089 (La. 2002) (the jurisprudential criteria governing the use of 
prior recorded testimony are subsumed in the requirements of Louisiana Code of 
Evidence article 804(B)(1) including the necessity of the offering party to show that 
the witness is unavailable; the trial court’s ruling in that regard is subject to review 
only for manifest error, which did not occur here, although the state’s documentary 
proof that the witness had died was shot through with unexplained discrepancies); 
State v. Williams, 800 So. 2d 819, 826 (La. 2002) (“The above erroneous findings 
of the trial court [concerning the officers’ knock-and-announce] to the contrary are 
manifestly erroneous and are hereby reversed.”); State v. Arnaud, 412 So. 2d 1013, 
1018 (La. 1982) (“When a trial judge has ruled that a child is competent to testify, 
his ruling will not be disturbed unless testimony brought up shows that the judge 
manifestly erred.”). For examples of the phrase “clearly erroneous,” see State v. 
Tyler, 723 So. 2d 939, 943 (La. 1998) (“A reviewing court should afford great 
deference to the trial judge's evaluation of discriminatory intent and should not 
reverse unless the evaluation is clearly erroneous.”); State v. Bennett, 345 So. 2d 
1129, 1132 (La. 1977) (“[T]he judge’s determination of a defendant’s present 
mental capacity is entitled to great weight and his ruling will be reversed only if it 
is clearly erroneous.”). 




evidence.”59 When appellate courts review motions to suppress, they look 
to the entirety of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and at 
the trial.60 
Appellate courts apply this type of review to many pretrial or 
procedural factual issues, including: (1) common evidentiary disputes;61 
(2) whether a trial court properly determined the venue of the trial;62 (3) 
whether a case was properly severed;63 (4) whether a defendant was timely 
brought to trial;64 (5) whether a judge properly ruled on a for cause 
challenge of a juror;65 or (6) whether a confession was voluntary.66 
“Manifest error” or “clearly erroneous,” however, are not the only 
phrases courts use to define the standard of review for pretrial factual 
disputes. Some appellate courts have reviewed pretrial or procedural 
                                                                                                             
 59. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1978). Although 
this is a civil case, this case provides the best articulation of the “manifest error” 
or “clearly erroneous” standard of review. 
 60. State v. Burkhalter, 428 So. 2d 449, 455 (La. 1983). 
 61. See State v. Stramiello, 392 So. 2d 425, 428 (La. 1980) (“Additionally, 
as the appellate court noted, the trial court is given great discretion in the 
admissibility and relevance of evidence such as this, which holding should not be 
disturbed on appeal, absent a clear abuse of discretion.”); State v. Scales, 655 So. 
2d 1326, 1330–31 (La. 1995) (trial court ruling on other crimes evidence can be 
abused); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939 (La. 1982) (competence of expert witness 
not disturbed unless manifest error). 
 62. See, e.g., State v. Wallis, 807 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Venue is a question of fact, and a jurisdictional matter that shall be proven by 
the state, by a preponderance of the evidence, in advance of trial.”). 
 63. State v. Allen, 677 So. 2d 709, 713 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a 
motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its 
ruling should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion). 
 64. State v. Francis, 977 So. 2d 187, 192 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing a 
trial court’s grant of a motion to quash because the trial court failed to take into 
account a May 31, 2005 defense continuance and an Executive Order that 
permitted an interruption caused by Hurricane Katrina). 
 65. State v. Knighton, 436 So. 2d 1141, 1148 (La. 1983). 
 66. Although that trial court determination can turn on the credibility of 
witnesses, an appellate court may still review and reverse the decision if that 
determination is unsupported by the evidence. See State v. Wilson, 119 So. 3d 843 
(La. Ct. App. 2013) (reviewing the record and testimony of the defendant’s 
intoxicated state to find that evidence not sufficient to vitiate the confession); State 
v. Brooks, 541 So. 2d 801, 814 (La. 1989) (“Voluntariness of a confession is a 
question of fact and the trial judge’s ruling thereon, based on conclusions of 
credibility and weight of the testimony, is given great weight. Such ruling will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the evidence.”). 




factual matters under a “heightened deference” standard that looks only for 
“no evidence.”67 For example, one recent court of appeal opinion stated: 
[W]e grant great deference to the factual findings of the district 
judge and will “not overturn those findings unless there is no 
evidence to support those findings.” Wells, 08–2262, p. 4, 45 
So.3d at 580. This extremely heightened deference is rooted in the 
limitations of our appellate jurisdiction set forth in La. Const. art. 
V, § 10(B), which provides: “In criminal cases, [an appellate 
court’s] jurisdiction extends only to questions of law.”68 
The issues in Le were pretrial and unrelated to whether the defendant 
was guilty or innocent.69 Nonetheless, the court cited the Louisiana 
Constitution and noted an appellate court gives the trial court decision 
“extremely-heightened deference.”70 
State v. Karey is a recent plurality Louisiana Supreme Court decision 
that applied a similar, heightened standard of review.71 At issue was whether 
there was an agreement between prosecutors and defense counsel to abide 
by the charge—e.g., manslaughter or second degree murder—of a grand 
jury determination.72 The defense argued that it assisted and cooperated 
with the prosecutors in exchange for the prosecutors abiding by a grand 
                                                                                                             
 67. See, e.g., State v. Le, 188 So. 3d 1072, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ 
denied sub nom. State v. Trung Le, 178 So. 3d 569 (La. 2015) (reviewing a trial 
judge’s ruling to redact identifying information of a witness, the court stated “we 
grant great deference to the factual findings of the district judge and will ‘not 
overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support those findings.’ This 
extremely heightened deference is rooted in the limitations of our appellate 
jurisdiction set forth in La. Const. art. V, § 10(B) . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); 
State v. Jones, 165 So. 3d 217, 224 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (reviewing adjudication as 
a fourth-felony offender under a “no evidence,” heightened-deference standard); 
State v. Dixon, 146 So. 3d 662, 666 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (stating there is an 
extremely deferential review for factual questions arising in a motion to quash); 
State v. Franklin, 147 So. 3d 231, 240 (La. Ct. App. 2014), writ denied, 159 So. 3d 
460 (La. 2015) (factual issues in motion to quash); State v. Thomas, 138 So. 3d 92, 
97 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (factual issues in motion to quash). 
 68. Le, 188 So. 3d at 1081 (citations omitted). 
 69. The court was reviewing “a trial judge’s ruling to maintain a redacting 
party’s deletion or excision of a witness’s identifying information . . . .” Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. State v. Karey, 232 So. 3d 1186 (La. 2017). 
 72. Id. at 1198 (finding an enforceable agreement not to prosecute because 
“[t]he district court’s decision to credit the defense testimony over that of the 
prosecution cannot be overturned”). 




jury decision.73 That grand jury returned an indictment against the 
defendant for manslaughter, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 
14:31.74 After the prosecutors took the case to a second grand jury, which 
returned an indictment for second degree murder, a violation of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 14:30.1, the defense counsel argued that the prosecutors 
breached their agreement.75 To determine whether an agreement existed, 
“a trial judge must first make findings of fact as to the terms of and the 
conditions surrounding that agreement and then apply those findings to 
principles of contract and constitutional law.”76 When the issue was before 
the Louisiana Supreme Court, it reviewed whether there was an 
enforceable agreement under a “no evidence” standard. In support, the 
court cited the Louisiana constitutional provisions on appellate review of 
facts in criminal matters.77 
Regardless of the standard of review, these examples demonstrate 
appellate courts can, and do, review a wide range of pretrial factual 
disputes. 
B. Trial 
Jackson v. Virginia is a seminal case concerning appellate review of 
criminal guilt.78 The U.S. Supreme Court held that, to safeguard a 
defendant’s due process right, an “appellate court must determine that the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was 
sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the 
crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”79 In applying this 
standard, the appellate court considers all evidence—even evidence 
parties erroneously admitted—at trial.80 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 1189. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. State v. Franklin, 147 So. 3d 231, 240 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 77. Id. 
 78. In Jackson v. Virginia, “the Court concluded that habeas courts must 
evaluate state convictions by determining whether a rational trier of fact could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In so deciding, the 
Court established a constitutionally mandated standard for review of all criminal 
convictions.” Note, Standard of Review of Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting 
Criminal Conviction, 93 HARV. L. REV. 199, 210 (1979). 
 79. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); see also State v. Captville, 448 
So. 2d 676, 678 (La. 1984). 
 80. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 (La. 1992); see also Lockhart 
v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988). 




Before Jackson, appellate courts in Louisiana could not review a 
conviction for sufficiency of evidence.81 Instead, appellate courts could 
only review the guilt or innocence of an accused when there was “no 
evidence.”82 In contrast, if there was some evidence supporting a finding 
of guilt or innocence, the issue would be beyond the scope of appellate 
review.83 
The Louisiana Supreme Court applied Jackson in its 1979 decision in 
State v. Mathews.84 Recognizing the importance of the Jackson decision 
on Louisiana state appellate review, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: 
[I]n Jackson, the United States Supreme Court held that due 
process requirements of the federal constitution are offended by a 
lesser standard of review than that enunciated by it. Although the 
issue arose in terms of federal habeas review, the Jackson holding 
also applies, inferentially, to state or federal direct review, where 
due process would be equally offended by a lesser standard.85 
Not all judges agreed that Jackson could upend the Louisiana 
Constitution. Dissenting from State v. Mathews, one justice stated: 
This majority opinion usurps the fact-finding prerogative of the 
trier of fact in its determination of guilt or innocence contrary to 
the specific limitation contained in Section 5(C) of Article V 
of the Constitution. . . . The reliance on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) to support the 
majority view is misplaced. That decision does not purport to 
invalidate Louisiana’s constitutional limitation on review of facts 
by this Court in criminal cases. So deeply ingrained is the law’s 
tradition of refusal to engage in after-the-fact review of jury 
deliberations, until the United States Supreme Court invalidates 
                                                                                                             
 81. See, e.g., State v. Celestine, 320 So. 2d 161, 162 (La. 1975) (“Defendant’s 
contention that the jury did not give him the benefit of every reasonable doubt is 
a fact question which we cannot review on appeal, and for that additional reason 
this improperly presented assignment of error has no merit.”); see also Hebert, 
supra note 37, at 846 (citing cases from 1945 to 1953). Nor could an appellate 
court review if the evidence was “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing State v. 
Bell, 177 So. 63, 64 (La. 1937) (“A complaint that the [criminal facts were] not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt raises an issue of fact, not an issue of law.”) 
and other cases from 1947 to 1953). 
 82. See Hebert, supra note 37, at 846. 
 83. See, e.g., State v. Di Vincenti, 93 So. 2d 676, 681 (La. 1957). 
 84. State v. Mathews, 375 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1979). 
 85. Id. at 1168. 




that concept in Louisiana’s Constitution, I will adhere to the 
Louisiana Constitution.86 
The dissenting view failed to carry the day. Problematically, the dissent 
ignored the supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court and federal law.87 The 
U.S. Supreme Court requires appellate courts to review for sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction. The standard that appellate courts must 
apply is “whether any alternate hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently 
reasonable that no rational factfinder . . . could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 Another way of viewing the Jackson standard 
is appellate courts review whether the conviction was rational.89 Sufficiency 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. at 1170. Similarly, in a case that reversed a defendant’s conviction 
because of insufficient evidence proving the defendant knew that the car had been 
stolen, a dissenting judge believed that Jackson v. Virginia could not alter the 
Louisiana constitutional scheme. State v. Ennis, 414 So. 2d 661 (La. 1982). In the 
dissenting judge’s view, Jackson v. Virginia only provided if a reviewing court 
has jurisdiction then it must review for sufficiency of evidence. But because 
Louisiana appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to review facts, Jackson v. 
Virginia does not apply. Id. at 666 (Lanier, J., dissenting). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”); see also Mathews, 375 So. 2d at 1168 (“Although the issue 
arose in terms of federal habeas review, the Jackson holding also applies, 
inferentially, to state or federal direct review, where due process would be equally 
offended by a lesser standard.”) 
 88. State v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 114 (La. 1990). Beyond the scope of this Article 
is Jackson’s impact on circumstantial versus direct evidence. See LA. REV. STAT. 
§ 15:438 (2018) (setting forth the statutory circumstantial evidence test); see also 
State v. Chism, 436 So. 2d 464, 469 (La. 1983) (“Circumstantial evidence 
involves, in addition to the assertion of witnesses as to what they have observed, 
a process of reasoning, or inference by which a conclusion is drawn. Like all other 
evidence, it may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be quite 
worthless, or it may be irresistible and overwhelming . . . .”). Nonetheless, future 
scholarship may wish to study the impact of Jackson on appellate review of 
circumstantial evidence, as it may be more significant than its impact on appellate 
review of direct evidence. 
 89. State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988) (“If rational triers of 
fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier’s view 
of all of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. Thus, 
irrational decisions to convict will be overturned, rational decisions to convict will 




review essentially addresses whether “the government’s case was so lacking 
that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.”90 On sufficiency 
review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a 
defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful 
opportunity to defend” against the charge against him and a jury finding of 
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”91 The reviewing court considers only the 
“legal” question “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”92 That limited 
review does not intrude on the jury’s role “to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 
basic facts to ultimate facts.”93 
Based on the Jackson precedent, appellate courts may reverse 
convictions based on insufficient evidence.94  
C. Sentencing 
If a court finds a defendant is found guilty, it must then determine the 
appropriate sentence.95 Although the Louisiana Legislature provides a 
sentencing range, appellate courts may review whether a sentence is 
excessive. As the examples below show, appellate courts review facts to 
review sentences. Under Louisiana Constitution article I, § 20: “No law 
shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or 
unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon 
termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any 
offense.”96 
                                                                                                             
be upheld, and the actual fact finder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the 
extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.”) 
 90. Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. See, e.g., State v. Maise, 172 So. 3d 639 (La. 2015) (convictions reversed, 
sentences vacated, remanded for new trial); State v. Washington, 412 So. 2d 991, 
993 (La. 1982) (conviction reversed); State v. Jack, 700 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (La. 
Ct. App. 1997) (conviction for possession of controlled substance with intent to 
distribute vacated and appellate court instructed the lower court to enter judgment 
on lesser included offense of possession). 
 95. See, e.g., State v. Mosby, 180 So. 3d 1274 (La. 2015) (finding a 30-year 
sentence excessive for a 72-year-old, non-violent offender). 
 96. LA. CONST. art. I, § 20. This constitutional article includes the word 
“excessive,” which differs from the Federal constitution, and the inclusion of that 




To review a sentence, appellate courts might review facts such as the 
seriousness of the crime—e.g., whether it is a crime of violence under 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:2 or a nonviolent offense. Appellate courts 
might also review the defendant’s conduct during the commission of the 
crime.97 Moreover, when imposing a sentence, the trial court “shall state 
for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis 
therefor in imposing sentence.”98 A specific procedural rule, Louisiana 
Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1, provides courts guidance on the 
facts to review.99 
These facts are not outside the scope of appellate review. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that excessive sentence review is a 
“question of law”:100 
Thus, under some circumstances—such as the prior history or 
criminal dispositions of a certain offender, the particular 
helplessness of a certain victim, or a particularly vicious method 
of committing the crime—the maximum penalty under the statute 
might clearly be justified; while the same punishment might be 
considered excessive if applied to a more typical offender who 
commits the crime under less gross circumstances. For instance, a 
penitentiary sentence of the maximum five years might easily be 
justified for a mature man who had seduced a frightened and 
confused twelve-year-old girl, under circumstances falling just 
short of rape, and who had exhibited similar behavior in the past 
but showed little hope of reformation. Yet such a penalty might be 
excessive if applied to a love-struck teenager, of otherwise 
umblemished character and record, who commits the offense in 
the course of a teenage romance.101 
                                                                                                             
word was a deliberate attempt to provide review of excessive sentences. State v. 
Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973, 977 (La. 1995). 
 97. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 894.1(B)(1)–(13) (2018). 
 98. Id. art. 894.1(C). By failing to do so, an appellate court may vacate the 
trial court’s imposition of a sentence and order the trial court to comply with this 
rule. See State v. Ladd, 164 So. 3d 184 (La. 2015); see also id. (Crichton, J., 
concurring) (“Without complying with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 
article 894.1(c), or for that matter supplying any reasons, the trial judge sentenced 
this young defendant to twenty years hard labor under La. R.S. 40:966(E)(3) and 
La. R.S. 15:529.1(3)(a).”). 
 99. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 894.1(B). 
 100. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1979). 
 101. Id. at 766–67. 




Appellate courts, therefore, have jurisdiction to review excessive 
sentences, even if that review necessarily involves fact-based issues.102 
Often, the appropriate standard of review is “manifest abuse of 
discretion.”103 
In addition to excessive sentence review, appellate courts review a 
sentence the defendant’s criminal history enhances. Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 15:529.1, commonly known as the “Habitual Offender Law,” 
provides certain mandatory sentences for persons convicted of a second or 
subsequent offense.104 Under this procedure, a court may enhance a 
sentence based on the degree of a defendant’s recidivism.105 The trial court 
determines whether a defendant has previous convictions.106 In general, a 
defendant may be deemed a multiple offender after: 
[T]he filing of a multiple offender bill of information; an 
appearance before the court; a contradictory hearing, if necessary; 
the presentation of evidence on which the district attorney bears 
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of 
fact; and either a finding by the court that the defendant has been 
convicted of a prior felony or felonies or the defendant’s 
acknowledgment or confession in open court, after being duly 
cautioned as to his rights, that he has been so convicted.107 
Whether a defendant is a multiple offender is a factual issue.108 These 
facts are not outside the scope of appellate jurisdiction. As the Louisiana 
Supreme Court noted in a different scenario, a “defendant’s status as a 
putative multiple offender is irrelevant to the determination of guilt or 
                                                                                                             
 102. For a discussion on this area of law shortly after the Louisiana Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in State v. Sepulvado, see Erick V. Anderson, Note, 
Appellate Review of Excessive Sentences in Non-Capital Cases Review in 
Louisiana, 42 LA. L. REV. 1080, 1084–85 (1982). 
 103. See State v. Shaikh, 236 So. 3d 1206, 1209 (La. 2017) (“The trial judge 
has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set sentences aside absent a 
manifest abuse of discretion.”). 
 104. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1 (2018). 
 105. State v. Guidry, 221 So. 3d 815, 820 (La. 2017). 
 106. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(D). 
 107. Guidry, 221 So. 3d at 820–21 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) 
and (b), (D)(2), and (D)(3)). That decision went on to hold that disclosing a 
defendant’s possible mandatory minimum under the Habitual Offender Law to 
the jury is an error. Id. at 820 (holding a defendant was not entitled to have a jury 
informed that, if convicted of charged offenses, he faced possibility of mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment as fourth habitual offender). 
 108. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(D)(1)(b). 




innocence of the tried offense.”109 Instead, these facts include, for example, 
whether the defendant and the prior convicted felon are the same person,110 
or whether a previous conviction is outside the time limitations the Habitual 
Offender Bill allows.111 Appellate courts review these types of facts, and, 
as seen through these examples, review facts to review sentences.112 
V. WHAT CRIMINAL FACTS CANNOT BE REVIEWED? 
In light of the foregoing and Article V of the Louisiana Constitution, 
it is unclear what facts an appellate court may not review. On the one hand, 
appellate court supervisory jurisdiction may be boundless. On the other 
hand, some jurisprudential limitations to appellate review of facts in 
criminal cases exist.  
A. Justice Tate’s Theory of Supervisory Jurisdiction 
Louisiana appellate courts possess “supervisory jurisdiction.”113 If a 
court must hear the appeal, then it has appellate jurisdiction. In contrast, if 
an appellate court has discretion to take the case, then that court has 
supervisory jurisdiction.114 As Justice Tate described, supervisory 
                                                                                                             
 109. Guidry, 224 So. 3d at 821. In support, the Court noted that, under the 
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, the scope of arguments at trial are 
confined to admitted evidence and applicable law under Louisiana Code of 
Criminal Procedure article 774, and a court must charge a jury as to the law and 
facts on the “question of guilt or innocence.” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 802(2) 
(2018) (“The court shall charge the jury: . . . [t]hat the jury is the judge of the law 
and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, but that it has the duty to 
accept and to apply the law as given by the court . . . .”). 
 110. State v. Payton, 810 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (La. 2002). The Court goes on to state:  
In attempting to do so, the State may present: (1) testimony from 
witnesses; (2) expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the defendant 
when compared with those in the prior record; (3) photographs in the duly 
authenticated record; or (4) evidence of identical driver’s license number, 
sex, race and date of birth. 
Id. 
 111. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C). 
 112. See, e.g., State v. Kisack, 236 So. 3d. 1201, 1205 (La. 2017) (holding that 
the State must prove as an element of the habitual offender adjudication that the 
time afforded by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:529.1(C) as not elapsed). The 
Court also reviewed the evidence and found that the State carried its burden. Id. 
 113. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A). 
 114. Hargrave, supra note 18, at 795 (“The distinction between supervisory 
and appellate jurisdiction is a continuation of existing terminology, ‘supervisory’ 
referring to the court’s discretionary jurisdiction under which it has the power to 




jurisdiction has been interpreted to be “plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional 
requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court.”115 
Armed with this knowledge, it is unclear whether the constitutional 
text limiting the jurisdiction of criminal cases really means “appellate 
jurisdiction” or whether it is instead governing all jurisdictional authority 
of the appellate court. For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over death penalty cases and in cases in which a trial 
court has declared a statute or ordinance unconstitutional. It is unknown 
whether this means the constitution restricts review of facts only in these 
cases, but not most other criminal cases, but it remains an interesting 
wrinkle in the constitutional text. 
The authority to issue a writ of certiorari and correct an error of a lower 
court is theoretically boundless.116 Logically, supervisory jurisdiction 
gives appellate courts the authority in criminal cases to review facts.117 
There is potentially no fact that an appellate court cannot review. 
B. Jurisprudential Restriction 
Supervisory jurisdiction aside, there may be some facts that an 
appellate court cannot review. For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
in State v. King ruled that article 851(1) motions for new trial are 
unreviewable.118 In granting an article 851(1) motion, a trial court believes 
the “verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.”119 An article 851(1) 
motion could occur if a trial court found a testifying witness unreliable, 
even if the jury relied on that witness in delivering a guilty verdict. When 
                                                                                                             
select the cases it will hear, and ‘appellate’ contemplating cases in which a party 
as a matter of right can demand that the court hear a case.”). 
 115. Albert Tate, Jr., Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 
38 TUL. L. REV. 429, 430 (1964). Justice Tate was an iconic scholar of Louisiana 
law. In the article, he notes that courts of appeal obtained the same plenary powers 
as the Louisiana Supreme Court by the 1958 constitutional amendment and cites 
a case that discusses this point. See also State Bond Comm’n v. All Taxpayers, 
Prop. Owners, & Citizens of State, 510 So. 2d 662, 663 (La. 1987) (“The 
constitutional grant of supervisory authority to this court is plenary, unfettered by 
jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the 
court.”). 
 116. See generally Comment, Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana over Inferior Courts, 34 TUL. L. REV. 146 (1959). 
 117. As mentioned in note 1, the U.S. Supreme Court also made this inference 
in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 161 n.6 (1961). 
 118. State v. King, 232 So. 3d 1207, 1215 (La. 2017). 
 119. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 851(B)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 




the trial court grants a motion under article 851(1), it essentially sits as a 
“thirteenth juror” and reweighs the evidence.120 
In King, after a jury returned verdicts of second degree murder and 
armed robbery, the trial court granted a motion for new trial.121 The trial 
court granted the new trial because it believed that certain witness 
testimony was not credible.122 The court of appeal reversed.123 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court held, however, that the court of appeal did not 
have jurisdiction to reverse the trial court’s grant of a new trial.124 The 
court noted that under article 858 of Louisiana’s Code of Criminal 
Procedure, “[n]either the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the 
supreme court may be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant 
a new trial, except for error of law.”125 Based on the rules of criminal 
procedure and the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
King held that it “does not permit fact-finding and credibility assessments 
by an appellate court in a criminal case.”126 King is a rare example of a 
                                                                                                             
 120. King, 232 So. 3d at 1214. 
 121. Id. at 1209. 
 122. Id. (specifically, the trial judge stated, “I’ve had a lot of problems with 
the testimony of [the witness] because of so many inconsistencies that she’s had 
in her testimony. And this is strictly a circumstantial case against Mr. King. There 
were no witnesses who testified that he committed the murder or he did the 
robbery other than [the witness], who was not a witness to the murder, just to the 
events that took place in the apartment. I’m going to grant your motion for new 
trial.”). 
 123. Id.  
 124. See generally id. 
 125. Id. at 1210; see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 858 (2018). This 
particular rule is a specialized application of the Louisiana constitutional article 
restricting appellate review of fact in criminal matters. A comment to this article 
notes that this is an application of the “constitutional limitation of the supreme 
court’s appellate jurisdiction to questions of law only.” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 858 cmt. a (2018). Yet, this comment is from 1966 and interprets the 
Constitution of 1921. Further, another comment states this applies to both 
appellate and supervisory jurisdictions. Id. art. 858 cmt. b. But this appears 
incongruent with Justice Tate’s view that courts cannot restrict supervisory; it is 
always plenary. 
 126. King, 232 So. 3d at 1213. In contrast, a motion for new trial based on a 
purely legal issue is one granted under article 851(B)(5), where “[t]he court is of 
the opinion that the ends of justice would be served . . . .” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
art. 851(B)(5). Appellate courts can review legal issues. See State v. Guillory, 45 
So. 3d 612, 615 (La. 2010) (“We find our jurisprudence holding the trial court’s 
ruling on a motion for a new trial to serve the ends of justice is reviewable under an 
abuse of discretion standard comports with the role of this Court and the appellate 
courts to review questions of law in criminal cases.”). 




Louisiana appellate court not having jurisdiction to review a case because 
it involved an unreviewable question of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question: in the Louisiana Constitution, what 
is the meaning of “appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law” 
for criminal matters? The Louisiana Constitution represents fundamental 
aspects of Louisiana law.127 Both the rights of defendants and the people’s 
interest in justice are at stake. Therefore, should Article V, §§ 5(C) and 10(B) 
have much continuing vitality? Should Justice Tate’s view of “plenary 
authority, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the 
complete discretion of the court” be the approach that appellate courts take? 
Alternatively, should appellate courts prevent any further erosion of Article 
V, §§ 5(C) and 10(B)? The answers to these questions may depend on what 
people believe should be the proper role of an appellate court. Should 
appellate courts have more or less authority? For the parties in a criminal 
proceeding, the answers may depend on whether they were successful at the 
trial court. To the public who elects the judges, the answers may depend on 
its view of criminal justice. 
Those fundamental aspects appear to differ for civil and criminal 
cases. The difference between civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction is 
easy to spot. For civil cases, appellate jurisdiction extends to questions of 
law and fact.128 For criminal cases, appellate jurisdiction only extends to 
questions of law.129 But, as this Article shows, the distance between those 
two forms of appellate review may not be as far as the language signals. 
Appellate courts in criminal cases may sometimes review facts. We found 
at least three standards Louisiana appellate courts apply to review facts in 
                                                                                                             
 127. According to the preamble to the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the 
purpose is to:  
protect individual rights to life, liberty, and property; afford opportunity 
for the fullest development of the individual; assure equality of rights; 
promote the health, safety, education, and welfare of the people; 
maintain a representative and orderly government; ensure domestic 
tranquility; provide for the common defense; and secure the blessings of 
freedom and justice to ourselves and our posterity. 
These bold declarations, although not binding, represent the aspirations for 
Louisiana law. See Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1974) (discussing the drafters’ debate 
over the preamble). 
 128. See LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5 & 10.  
 129. Id. 




criminal matters. More standards may exist, as it was beyond the scope of 
this Article to discuss all issues appellate courts review in criminal cases. 
This conclusion may appear uncertain, but that uncertainty reflects the 
shifting nature of the legal landscape. Thus, though this Article may raise 
more questions than it answers, its purpose is to reignite interest among 
Louisiana practitioners, lawmakers, and academics to discuss the scope of 
appellate review of criminal cases. 
 
